In Japan, the dominant party holds on to power

Snap elections for Japan’s lower house (House of Representatives) held on October 27 went against the government, costing it its majority. However, unlike other democracies, there has been no change of government this year, so the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) continues to stand out as the quasi-permanent ruling party. However, the survival of the new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is much more in question.

The LDP was formed in 1955 as a result of the merger of two conservative parties and since then has governed continuously (although sometimes leading a coalition) with only two brief interruptions. The party has always been divided into factions and she is now the 25th prime minister since 1955. Historically, the one-party advantage of the LDP was due to a combination of Japan’s spectacular economic success (until the 1980s) and the weakness, or at least extremism, of the mainstream party. the opposition Socialist Party (also until the 1980s), as well as less than fair elections (including bribery and early voter intimidation, as McElwain and Yoshikawa recently noted in their book section“Japan: Manipulation (at) the Margins.” Given these factors, their repeated corruption scandals did not oust them from power until 1993, when various reformist MPs broke away from the LDP to form two new parties. Since 2012, the LDP has been governed by Komeito, a party based on a Buddhist sect.

LDP prime ministers have varied in effectiveness, with the weaker ones having limited periods in power. Of recent prime ministers, Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 and 2012-2020, thus Japan’s longest-serving prime minister) has been both domineering and nationalist-conservative, increasing the ability of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to operate internationally and limited the freedom of the press (where Japan is still the lowest among the G7 countries) through direct intervention and intimidation. Abe resigned due to ill health and was succeeded by Yoshihide Suga, who was in turn succeeded by Fumio Kishida in the 2021 election. By 2024, however, the return of inflation and new corruption scandals, including LDP MPs raising spare funds by selling tickets to party events in excess of the membership quota, then misappropriating and failing to report the surplus, had led to record low approval ratings for the party. In 2024, Kishida retired.

In the fight for his successor, the reformist Shigeru Ishiba (on his fifth attempt to become the leader) defeated a tough candidate in the second round of voting. Ishiba advocates social reforms, such as not requiring married women to take their husband’s surname and allowing same-sex marriage. Immediately after becoming prime minister, Ishiba announced election plans before the multi-party opposition could fully unite (they could not always agree on a single candidate in each single-member district). however, the new cabinet was very traditionalIshiba abandoned his reforms, and the LDP was found to be channeling funds indirectly to disgraced candidates it did not endorse (most of the disgraced candidates were still endorsed). In short, Ishiba seemed to be co-opted hard line party.

So, including the funding scandals, the LDP (which itself had a majority until 2021) lost 68 seats, falling to 191 out of 465. Komeito, for its part, lost a quarter of its seats (including its leader’s seat). ). Thus, Japan shares the reality of voter swings against incumbents that have occurred in every democratic country this year. The main opposition center-left Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) won 52 seats, taking it to 148. The other major winner was the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), which wants to raise the income tax threshold and highlighted popular issues. with young people, for example, free education (and there was the most popular party among voters in 20 years).

In addition, this time the traditional aspects of Japanese elections did not help the LDP as much. The first is maldistribution, with rural Japan (which supports the LDP) traditionally being overrepresented to the extent that the courts declared the results unconstitutional. However, before the 2024 elections there was a redistribution which added ten urban places and removed ten rural ones. Of the ten liquidated village seats, eight belonged to districts where there is a LDP. A second contextual aspect is the really short election period in Japan. It’s just 12 days (this has been cut many times in the past), with no pre-campaign. Such a short period – almost as short as eight-day campaigns in Singapore’s electoral autocracy – favors incumbents over unknown challengers, and limits the effectiveness of the opposition party in economic matters. However, even in these short campaigns, issues of corruption will still reach Japanese voters.

All that said, Japanese voters sought to punish the LDP more than actually changing the government. This is due to the lack of trust in the opposition government, at least at the national level. No period of the opposition’s rule left a positive impression. After the 1993 elections mentioned above, no fewer than seven parties were part of the government. She succeeded in implementing political reforms, including changing the electoral system to eliminate candidates from the same party who competed against each other (which contributed to corruption), but then the various parties split over tax and defense policies. Thus, a year later, the LDP returned to the government, concluding an agreement with the Socialists, as a result of which the latter received the Prime Minister. By 1996, the LDP also regained the prime minister. Then in 2009, not only with scandal but with record high unemployment, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a majority on its own.

This DPJ-led government was certainly more coherent than the 1993 government, but unfortunately it was in power when the 2011 earthquake and Fukushima accident happened, and its record was extremely poor. He also decided to double the sales tax to stabilize the budget, which he did clearly unpopular politically and, as a result, the LDP convincingly returned to power in 2012. Finally, it may be noted that although the 2009 election saw a surge in voter turnout—a factor that often occurs in “change” elections— in 2024, there was no such increase. Instead, some traditional LDP voters simply stayed home.

Although there was some discussion about expanding the coalition, the respective opposition parties were not interested; eventually the LDP and Komeito formed a two-party minority government. This result was facilitated by Japan’s rules for entering the office of prime minister, which require a majority in the first round of voting and a majority of votes between the top two candidates in the second round. At the vote on November 11, the opposition demonstrated a complete lack of unity with no fewer than eight opposition party leaders are challenging Ishiba for prime minister in the first round of voting. On the contrary, Komeito voted for the LDP. Thus, in the first round of voting, Ishiba received 221 votes to 151 for the leader of the CDP, former opposition Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. The rest went to smaller party leaders. In the second round of voting (the first required since 1994), these smaller parties almost all abstained, so that Ishiba again received 221 votes, while Noda’s increased to only 160. Thus, the LDP remains in power.

However, this minority government will be more focused on survival and therefore unlikely to deal with him Long-standing problems of Japan’s economic stagnation and demographic crisis. For the adoption of the budget, the most likely scenario is an agreement with the PPP, which took fourth place, for which The price is an expensive increase in the income tax threshold. More generally, for the first time in three decades, a member of the opposition will lead the powerful budget committee of the lower house.

As for Ishiba himself, there is no certainty that he will last as prime minister, and in addition to potentially losing a vote of no confidence, he could at some point be ousted by his own party. Elections are next July for half of Japan’s upper house (the House of Councilors), in which the coalition still has a slim majority, and if support for the government does not improve, it would not be a shock if the LDP replaces Ishiba. election. The combination of LDP dominance with a weak prime minister may seem paradoxical, but it is a general reality in Japan, as opposition governments and strong, long-lasting LDP prime ministers have been exceptional.