Moldova repels Russian influence by re-electing its pro-Western leader

On October 20, Moldovans were urged to vote in a referendum aimed at including a new article in their constitution that would make EU membership a “national strategic goal”.

The average national wealth per capita in the EU is almost five times higher than in Moldova, so a yes vote seemed a foregone conclusion.

But, to everyone’s surprise, the referendum passed with the smallest majority: only 50.5 percent voted for the EU and 49.5 percent voted against.

This was primarily due to a negative campaign by a certain Ilan Shor, a convicted fraudster and key figure in the 2014 grand theft case, in which US$1 billion (S$1.3 billion) was stolen, equivalent to about 12 percent of the entire Moldova. national wealth – was stolen from the country’s banks through fictitious loans.

Shor, who fled Moldova, is now a Russian citizen and follows Moscow’s orders. During the EU referendum campaign, Moldova’s Internal Security Service accused him of depositing around US$15 million into the bank accounts of more than 130,000 Moldovan citizens to secure their “no” vote.

Schor’s money was also likely behind President Sandu’s failure to secure an absolute majority in the first round of the presidential election, which was held at the same time as the October 20 referendum.

That forced Ms Sanda into a run-off presidential election on November 3, when Russia went to even greater extraordinary lengths to ensure her defeat.

The main source of foreign currency inflows to Moldova are remittances from its citizens, with up to 30 percent of the population working abroad.

Russian authorities have guaranteed that Moldovans working in Russia will vote against Ms Sandu.

Videos circulating on social media show Moldovan citizens being led in organized convoys to vote at Moldovan embassies and consulates in Russia and Belarus, Russia’s closest ally.

Since there were few Moldovan polling stations in Russia, the Russians also arranged flights for Moldovan expatriates to vote in other locations, such as Istanbul in Turkey.

Moldovans working in the EU, most of whom support Ms Sandu, have been subjected to separate intimidations, such as fake videos claiming Ms Sandu is mentally ill or personalized threats via text messages to mobile phones.

Several explosions led to the temporary closure of polling stations in Germany and neighboring Romania, where the majority of Moldovans abroad live. The aim of the exercise was to limit the number of Moldovans from the diaspora who could vote, with some awareness that this could harm Ms Sandu’s re-election prospects.

Russia’s efforts to distort the election ultimately failed, but only narrowly. Ms. Sandu won solely thanks to the votes cast for her by the Moldovan diaspora; if this decision was left only to those who live in Moldova, the new president of the country would be pro-Russian – this is exactly what Moscow wanted.

In Georgia, where Russian troops invaded in 2008 to maintain influence in the country, similar recent attempts by Russia to interfere in elections have been far more successful.

The Georgian Dream party, founded and funded by Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili, another rich man who made money in Russia and often repeats pro-Russian narratives, claims to have won 54 percent of the country’s ballots in parliamentary elections held on October 26.

International observers and Ms. Salome Zurabishvili, Georgia’s pro-Western president, have accused the election of being marred by episodes of vote-buying and ballot-stuffing, as well as voter intimidation and pressure, largely at the behest of Russia.

These allegations are not as well documented as Russia’s actions in Moldova. But there is no doubt that the victory of the Georgian Dream party is a dream come true for Russia.

There is also no doubt that the Russian authorities will continue to allocate generous financial and political resources to influence future elections in their neighbors.

“Europe should expect increasingly open forms of election interference. This will become a standard and more aggressive method of operation for Russia,” says Ms. Oana Popescu-Zamfir, a well-known European expert on Russian disinformation strategies.

“Most attempts to manipulate the elections will take place long before the voting day. And the majority will take place outside the target country,” warns the director and founder of the GlobalFocus Center, a think tank on foreign policy and security.