DOD promotes biometric safety while DHS faces privacy issues

The Government’s Audit Report (GAO) has raised red flags on confidentiality vulnerability in the HART Department of Internal Security (DHS). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense (DO) has successfully moved to the cloud of its automated biometric identification system (Abis), offering valuable biometric IT lessons.

The contrast between the two programs emphasizes the importance of proactive risk management, a reliable security framework and a clear management policy. As federal agencies continue to accept advanced biometric technologies, balancing innovations with confidentiality protection will be crucial for both security and civil freedoms.

Dod applied a different approach to expanding biometric capabilities through ABIS, which processes up to 45,000 biometrics daily and can increase up to 100,000 during major operations. Abis has undergone a significant transformation through cloud migration. Unlike DHS calls with Hart, DOD successfully moved its ABI to a highly safe level of exposure 5 AWS Cloud Architecture, improving speed, safety and scalability.

Dod abis plays a crucial role in identifying persons who are interested in the fields of battles, borders and military bases around the world. It processes several biometric methods, including fingerprints, palm prints, a iris scan, face recognition and voice recognition. From the repository of more than 30 million biometric records between DODs, federal agencies and international partners, the system required modernization and efficiency.

The transition from local servers to cloud infrastructure has agreed with ABI with zero dood trust architecture, reducing security vulnerabilities while ensuring seamless scalability.

The key aspect of migration was to support compatibility with critical systems such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) The next generation identification DHS identification system and databases. Abis also manages critical lists of watches, guaranteeing that modern biometric data is available on different platforms, including field devices used by military and intelligence commands. The purpose of migration was to preserve the existing opportunities to increase the speed of processing and streamline the development of new functionality.

Unlike the risks identified in HART, the approach to incremental DOD migration is minimized and ensured operational continuity. Instead of risky transmission, Abis was migrated in logical phases, reducing the likelihood of failures in the system and technical problems. Leidos, the chief contractor who supervises migration, worked closely with DOD to effectively implement the clouds, demonstrating a methodical approach to the modernization of IT.

Moving to AWS GovCloud, ABIS significantly improved the speed of processing, reducing the turning time for biometric analyzes by 10 to 15 percent. The expanded system capacity allows military and intelligence teams to make faster decisions guided by data in this field. With increased flexibility of safety and operation, the upgraded ABIS infrastructure acts as evidence of successful implementation of cloud systems of biometric identification in federal agencies.

“We reduced the risk of prompt influence, from the best working condition up to the rear computing environment, moving pieces of the system that were logically grouped by additional deployment,”-said Leidos DOD ABIS ABIS Manager David Jones.

“When we face a potential opponent in some distant place, it is important that warriors and other agencies understand whether this person has a previous history of the threat,”-explained J. Burton, General of Brigade in the army retired. “Are they in the observation list? WE HAVE HOW HAPPENED THEM EARTUAL? Providing timely, accurate and complete answers to the Dod Abis end users makes it easier to make decisions on the front edge. “

However in DHS, GAO found privacy problems with FurThe biometric identity system that is designed to replace the existing automated biometric identification system (identifier), which is expected to increase the government’s ability to collect, store and process sensitive biometric data. GAO audit Emphasizes significant risks of technology -related privacy, causing concern about data safety, unauthorized observation and potential abuse of personal information.

Hart is a critical IT acquisition that will serve many agencies, including DHS, the State Department and the Ministry of Justice. It is intended to improve the process of verification of identity for immigration, investigations of law enforcement agencies and national security operations. However, the report defines Hart as one of the acquisitions with the highest risk of privacy. The Data Collection Scale and HART storage increases the likelihood of security, unauthorized access and incorrect use of data. Given that biometric data is unchanged, the rates to protect this information are extremely high.

One of the central problems of Hart Privacy is the potential for mass observation and tracking. GAO warned that a huge system database could enable the government to control people on an unprecedented scale, raising the issue of civil liberty and data protection. Proponents of privacy have warned that without reliable guarantees Hart can be used outside its predictable volume, which leads to observation of persons and communities compliance with laws. The integration of the system with other government databases and law enforcement networks enhances these risks, which makes it necessary for DHS to exercise strict access control and supervision mechanisms, GAO said.

GaO also stressed the call of biometric data against a cyber -program. Unlike alphanumeric data, biometric information that is broken cannot be dumped or replaced. Hart database violations can be exposed to millions of people theft and fraud. The audit report emphasizes that DHS should take advanced encryption and anonymization methods to reduce these risks. However, GAO revealed DHS approach to the risk management of privacy, noting that the Department did not fully address the previous recommendations related to the protection against biometric data.

Another important issue defined in the report is the lack of transparency as to how biometric data will be shared with other federal, state and international organizations. Hart is designed to facilitate the exchange of data between agencies, but GAO is concerned that DHS did not clearly outline the policy to save data, exchange of transactions and supervision mechanisms. Without clear rules and accountability measures, there is a risk that biometric data may be available or used outside its initial purpose. The report calls DHS to establish a strict data management policy to prevent the abuse of potential abuse and ensure compliance with privacy laws.

GAO also found that DHS has encountered problems in the implementation of privacy within HART because of the complexity of integration of security measures into such a large-scale IT system. The development of the system has been delayed, partly because of difficulties in reconciling the guarantee of privacy with operational needs. The audit report warns that if DHS does not prioritize confidential reasons from the outset, the system can be launched with insufficient protection, increasing the risk of future violations and abuse.

The potential consequences of failure in resolving these risks of privacy are strict. Gao has pointed out in the past where poor biometric safety measures have led to significant data violations. For example, customs and border protection 2019 violates facial recognition data collected from travelers. A similar violation in Hart can have far -reaching consequences that affect not only US citizens, but also foreign citizens whose biometric information is stored in the system. The report emphasizes that the protection of this data is not only a problem of privacy, but also national security issues.

GAO recommended that DHS take several urgent steps to reduce the risks of privacy associated with HART. First, DHS must implement a comprehensive assessment of the impact on confidentiality to evaluate and resolve potential risks before full deployment. Secondly, DHS should strengthen its encryption and anonymization protocols to protect biometric data against cyber threats. Third, DHS needs to increase transparency, clearly defining how biometric information will exchange, store and use for various agencies. Finally, DHS must ensure constant supervision and independent audit to monitor the protection of confidentiality and prevent unauthorized use of HART data.

Hart is a significant progress in biometric technology, but it also creates unprecedented confidential problems. The GAO audit report makes it clear that without reliable guarantees, the system can lead to widespread observation, unauthorized data exchange and increased vulnerability to cyber threats. GAO’s findings are a critical warning that, although technological progress in verifying identity is necessary, they should not be valuable for privacy and security.

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